Do you agree that the three market  participants he named were “bad eggs”?
Why or why not?

Throughout this proceeding RI has claimed that Illinois customers will not pay the
Project’s costs. Because this fact is critical not just to protect customers, but also underlies RI’s economic case, the Order includes a condition stating that RI must seek Commission approval “prior to recovering any Project costs from Illinois retail ratepayers through PJM or MISO regional cost  allocation[.]”  While ComEd agrees fully with the Commission’s intent, this condition cannot be relied upon to protect customers, for several reasons.

FERC has exclusive authority over  transmission rates under federal law. It is far
from clear that FERC or a federal court would find that Illinois can require an applicant to waive the ability to petition FERC to approve any specific type of transmission rate, or could enforce such a waiver against a FERC finding that it was “just and reasonable” to pass costs on to customers. 

Even if the Commission could void the CPCN if RI (or a successor) made such a request to FERC, it is not clear what effect that “remedy” would have on customers’ rates. By then, the costs would be incurred and the line would be transmitting power in interstate commerce.

The Order’s condition does not apply to other parties (e.g., generators, shippers) who
could ask FERC to modify the rate to shift costs to customers, even if RI never did.

Similarly, the Order does not limit the  authority of FERC itself, which could sua
sponte revise RI’s rates, either in a RI-specific or a more broadly based investigation
proceeding. FERC has the power to “determine the just and reasonable rate … to be
thereafter observed” (16 U.S.C § 824e (2012)) in response to such a complaint or
upon its own motion, not just a filing by RI.

At a minimum, given the critical importance of shielding Illinois customers from Project
costs, the viability of this condition as a means of protecting customers – and potential
alternatives including financial security – warrants deeper examination on rehearing.

As multiple intervenors have pointed out in this docket that Rock Island’s failure to produce a needs analysis from PJM and/or MISO hurts all of the stakeholders, it seems like this problem could have easily been avoided. The absence of this global analysis produces increased unpredictability and either slows or jeopardizes other legitimate transmission projects. This risk to the consumers could have easily been prevented.

Now, other potentially viable and successful transmission projects will have to wait on the sidelines to see if Rock Island can get its act together by, among other things, finding money, qualified employees, suppliers, and numerous regulatory approvals. None of this benefits Illinois consumers, the market, or the reliability of the electric system. Instead, it puts everything at greater risk.

The purchase of these lands by The Conservation Fund from willing and interested sellers without the use of any taxpayer dollars, and their subsequent transfer to the NPS, ensures that they remain in the public trust for future generations to learn from and enjoy and that they will continue to provide both ecological and economic benefits to the region.

The Committee expected the mayor to give an opening statement and then JCP&L would give their presentation, followed by a question-and-answer period. A committee member said that it turned out to be a JCP&L public relations presentation, and the company made no effort to discuss the problems and possible solutions.

Powhatan Energy Fund has decided to take down its website at www.ferclitigation.com.  And, while the site is down, Powhatan will be declining all new requests to speak with the media and requests to present at conferences.

"It's evident that the mandatory capacity markets are not delivering benefits to electricity customers. They are not even markets," said APPA President and CEO Sue Kelly. "Billions of dollars are flowing from the pockets of bill-paying customers to generators and capacity providers, and our study shows that the vast majority of these dollars are being spent to prop up a market structure that does not work. At some point, we just have to stop the music."

The APPA study underscores a central flaw in the mandatory capacity markets -- they do not support the stable long-term financial arrangements required to build new power plants. As the electricity industry faces new challenges from environmental regulations, baseload retirements, and an increased reliance on natural gas, it is crucial that the RTOs and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) revisit the mandatory capacity markets paradigm, APPA says.

APPA encourages approaches to resource development that incorporate long-term planning, bilateral contracting, utility ownership, and demand-side approaches, and continues to advocate that the FERC mandate a transition from mandatory capacity markets to voluntary residual markets, where states and local public power and cooperative utilities will be able to procure the capacity they need through bilateral contracts -- allowing states and utilities to determine the optimal mix of resources and structure their portfolios to lower costs, maximize reliability and be good environmental stewards.